How To Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry Resolution by Jin, Kwon-Yong
TH AL LAW JO RAL
KWON-YONG JIN
How To Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions,
Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of
Entry Resolution
ABSTRACT. This Note evaluates the Orderly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd-Frank
Act (OLA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's "Single Point of Entry" (SPOE)
strategy. Applying organizational theory, this Note finds that because the parent and the subsid-
iaries of a financial group are not perfect substitutes, adoption of the OLA and the SPOE strategy
can lead to behavioral changes that undermine the OLA. Moreover, due to the lack of clear asset
segregation in financial groups, adoption of the OLA can lead to uncertainty and liquidity issues.
In response, this Note proposes a package of solutions, including an expanded government back-
stop and subsidiary-level stress testing.
AUTHOR. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2015; Harvard University, A.B. 2012. I thank Pro-
fessor Richard Squire for his guidance and mentorship during this project and Professor Henry
Hansmann, Ida Araya-Brumskine, Moeun Cha, Jack Mizerak, Gabriel Rosenberg, Erick Sam,
and Conrad Scott for their thoughtful comments. I also thank Charlie Dameron and the editors




1. ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY (OLA): KEY PROVISIONS 1753
A. Statutory Framework of the Orderly Liquidation Authority 1753
B. The FDIC's Roadmap for Implementation of the OLA: Single Point of
Entry (SPOE) 1756
II. GOALS OF AN OPTIMAL RESOLUTION STRATEGY 1759
III. ADVANTAGES OF THE OLA AND THE SPOE STRATEGY 1761
A. The SPOE Approach Enables Quick Resolution of a Large Financial
Group 1761
B. The SPOE Approach Reduces Moral Hazard for the Parent's Creditors
and Shareholders 1762
C. The SPOE Approach Maintains Stability While a Firm Is in Resolution 1764
IV. CORPORATE GROUP STRUCTURE AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE OLA 1765
A. The SPOE Strategy Increases the Moral Hazard of the Subsidiaries'
Creditors 1766
B. The SPOE Strategy Encourages Financial Groups To Shift Liabilities to
Their Subsidiaries 1769
C. The SPOE Approach Relies on an Unrealistic Assumption of Clear Asset
Segregation 1772
V. IMPROVING THE OLA AND THE SPOE STRATEGY 1778
A. The FDIC Should Embrace an Expanded Government Backstop but
Impose Corresponding Costs To Reduce Moral Hazard 1778
B. Subsidiary-Level Stress Testing Can Be a Self-Enforcing Solution to the
Asset Segregation Problem 1783
CONCLUSION 1786
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions are, by nature, vulnerable to sudden failures in times
of economic distress. Their business model often relies on one key characteris-
tic: maturity transformation.' Through maturity transformation, financial in-
termediaries take the assets of depositors and other short-term lenders, pool
those assets, and invest in long-term projects.2 In this process, short-term as-
sets are "transformed" into long-term assets. Maturity transformation connects
lenders who have funds to invest but want access to them on short notice with
borrowers who need funds for long-term projects.3
Maturity transformation has two important implications for the stability of
the financial intermediary. First, because a financial institution cannot easily
sell off the illiquid, long-term loans and other assets it holds, it must accept a
significant discount for its assets when it is forced to liquidate them rapidly due
to external pressures (often called a "fire sale").' Second, a financial intermedi-
ary is almost always highly leveraged, meaning that its shareholders' equity is a
tiny fraction of its total assets and that the financial intermediary funds its as-
1. See William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., More
Lessons from the Crisis, Remarks at the Center for Economic Policy Studies Symposium,
Princeton, New Jersey 5 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.bis.org/review/rogl7a.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G9GE-RHDL]. Not all financial institutions engage in maturity transformation -
for example, insurance companies do not- but a significant number of large financial insti-
tutions borrow with short-term liabilities and invest in long-term assets.
2. See Sandra C. Krieger, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Reducing the Sys-
temic Risk in Shadow Maturity Transformation, Remarks at the Global Association of Risk
Professionals 12th Annual Risk Management Convention, New York City (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2oii/kri1o3o8.html [http://perma.cc
/B6QZ-MNEL]; Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2014 Financial Markets Conference, Atlan-
ta, Georgia (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen2o14
o415a.htm [http://perma.cc/5AXX-GTKV].
3. Edward Simpson Prescott, Introduction to the Special Issue on the Diamond-Dybvig Model, 96
FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q.1, 1-2 (2010).
4. In other words, financial institutions have much lower liquidation value compared to their
going-concern value. Going-concern value refers to the value of the company as a
continually-operating firm, while liquidation value refers to the value of the company when
it is sold off piecemeal. Most firms have higher going-concern value than liquidation value,
but this difference is even starker in the case of financial institutions. For evidence of fire
sale discounts in the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market during the re-
cent financial crisis, see Craig B. Merrill et al., Why Were There Fire Sales of Mortgage-Backed
Securities by Financial Institutions During the Financial Crisis? 27 (Ohio State Univ. Fisher
Coll. of Bus. Working Paper No. 2013-03-02, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212684
[http://perma.cc/JXB9-UASK] ("All else equal, when selling an RMBS, a firm that experi-
enced a larger negative operating cash flow sold RMBS at a statistically significant greater
decline in price compared to a firm with a less negative operating cash flow shock.").
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sets largely by borrowing.' As a result of these characteristics, financial institu-
tions are susceptible to liquidity runs that can cause insolvency.6 In the event of
a negative shock to the economy, lenders might rapidly withdraw their money
from a financial intermediary (a liquidity run), and since many financial inter-
mediaries only have a small sliver of equity,7 they can easily fall insolvent if the
initial phase of a liquidity run forces a fire sale of long-term assets and a conse-
quent decrease in asset value. Facing the prospect of insolvency of the financial
intermediary, the remaining lenders would also rush to withdraw their money,
creating a vicious cycle.
This vicious cycle played a particularly prominent role during the financial
crisis of 2007-o8, especially in the failure of Lehman Brothers, which was then
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.! Because of the deteri-
oration of the housing market that started in 2006, Lehman Brothers' real es-
tate-related assets had created concerns in the market. Lehman had funded
those assets with short-term loans (including repurchase agreements, or "re-
pos"), with maturities as short as one day.9 In normal times, Lehman was able
to renew its overnight loans as they came due, as the providers of those loans
continued to have faith in Lehman's ability to repay a day later. However, as
concerns over the investment bank's balance sheet mounted, and those same
lenders lost faith in Lehman's ability to repay, Lehman's funding dried up. Its
counterparties refused to roll over short-term loans and demanded larger col-
lateral for the same loan amount.1° This process accelerated in the week leading
up to September 15, 2008, when the investment bank collapsed." The Chapter
11 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing scramble for the invest-
ment bank's assets destroyed the remaining franchise value and pushed asset
S. See Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al., Leverage Across Firms, Banks, and Countries 43 fig.3 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 17354, 2on), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w17354.pdf [http://perma.cc/LAX-7 KS2] (indicating that between 2o00 and 2009, in the
aggregate, commercial banks were leveraged at least ten-to-one, meaning that their equity
only amounted to one-tenth of assets, and broker-dealers were leveraged at least twenty-to-
one).
6. See Prescott, supra note 3, at 2. Insolvency means that the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets.
A liquidity run can cause balance sheet insolvency by forcing the debtor to sell its assets at
depressed prices to raise cash.
7. See Kalemli-Ozcan et al., supra note 5, at 43 fig-3.
8. Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy Case as Suitors
Balk, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2008, 9:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=awh5hRyXkvs4 [http://perma.cc/B8WU-RSV7].
9. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANcIAL CRISIS INQtuiRY REPORT 326, 328 (2Oll) [here-
inafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT].
1o. Id. at 328.
ii. Id. at 324-43.
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values down even further; Lehman's unsecured creditors recovered only twen-
ty-one percent of their claims.'"
This inherent instability of financial institutions creates the need for a reso-
lution regime for systemically important financial institutions. Banks do fail,
and when major banks fail, their failure damages the real economy tremen-
dously. 3 For example, the financial crisis of 2007-08 left a tremendous credit
gap, leading to a significant reduction in loans extended. 4 As a result of this
"credit crunch," the unemployment rate in the United States shot up from
5.0% in December 2007 to lo.o% in October 2oo9.'" While the risk of a finan-
cial institution failure may be mitigated ex ante by measures that regulate
banks' balance sheet composition and risk metrics, 6 it may be impossible to
prevent financial institution failures altogether. A certain degree of risk-taking
by financial institutions is necessary if they are to fulfill their mission of con-
necting lenders with borrowers through maturity transformation. That risk-
taking, however prudent, creates some possibility of failure. Therefore, ex ante
measures must be coupled with an ex post resolution mechanism designed to
wind down failing financial institutions in case of a crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority ("the OLA") is an
answer to this call. 7 The failure of Lehman Brothers showed that there was no
suitable mechanism for rehabilitating or liquidating a troubled investment
bank. While the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had statutory
power to wind down insured commercial banks, that power did not reach non-
depository financial institutions, such as independent investment banks.'"
Therefore, before the OLA, policymakers had only two options for faltering in-
12. Jonathan Stempel, Lehman Plans to Distribute $14.2 Billion to Creditors, REUTERS (Mar.
27, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2o13/o3/27/us-lehman-bankruptcy
-idUSBRE92QoHV2o 130327 [http://perma.cc/ZG6R-WPYR].
13. In this Note, "banks" refers not only to commercial or investment banks but also to a broad-
er category of financial institutions. For commercial banks, the FDIC receivership mecha-
nism mitigates systemic risk concerns, but as seen later in this Note, the FDIC receivership
may not be sufficient for large commercial banks. See infra Part I.
14. See Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2oo8,
97J. FIN. ECON. 319, 319 (2010).
15. Federal Reserve Economic Data: Civilian Unemployment Rate, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LouIs, http://research.sdouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE [http://perma.cc/88RP-U7J9];
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 23.
16. These measures aim to reduce the probability of failure for major financial institutions by
making them less risky. For example, such measures may include increased capital require-
ments, increased liquidity requirements, and regulation of assets that major financial insti-
tutions may hold.
17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201-
17, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2012).
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vestment banks: bankruptcy (for example, Lehman Brothers) or bailout (for
example, Bear Stearns or AIG).'" Neither option was attractive. The case of
Lehman Brothers had shown that the Bankruptcy Code could not deal effec-
tively with the failure of a large financial institution. Once Lehman filed for
bankruptcy, its counterparties -whose "qualified financial contracts" were ex-
empt from the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay- effectively dismembered
Lehman's derivatives portfolio, resulting in tremendous destruction of value.'
Moreover, while ad hoc bailouts had saved several large financial institutions in
2oo8, they were also politically unpopular and criticized for encouraging moral
hazard and excessive risk-taking.' Large, complex financial institutions, know-
ing that policymakers cannot let them fail lest their failure jeopardize the whole
financial system, would take even more risks as a result of this implicit gov-
ernment backstop, increasing the size of their balance sheets in the process and
creating a vicious cycle. The OLA aims to fill this gap, providing the FDIC with
the power to wind down systemically important financial institutions in an or-
derly fashion.
Of course, quickly liquidating a major financial group in an orderly manner
is no easy task. Large financial groups are behemoths with hundreds of subsid-
iaries and intricate webs of guarantees. To solve this problem, in December
2012, the FDIC proposed a Single Point of Entry strategy ("SPOE," "the SPOE
strategy," or "the SPOE approach") for exercising its OLA powers.' Under
SPOE, when a financial group is in danger of failing, the FDIC would place the
parent company of that group into receivership but leave its subsidiaries out of
19. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 291, 343, 352.
20. See Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, Economic Commentary: How Well Does
Bankruptcy Work When Large Financial Firms Fail? Some Lessons from Lehman Brothers, FED.
RES. BANK CLEV. (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2oii
/2011-23.cfm [http://perma.cc/ 54RC-FDWD].
21. If the federal government assumes the downside risk of a bad investment by bailing out
large financial institutions, the financial institutions' shareholders and creditors have even
more incentive to gamble with the firms' assets. For examples of the reactions to the bailouts
of large financial institutions in 20o8, see Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Lehman Brothers
and the Persistence of Moral Hazard, WASH. POST: HEARING (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:33 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/o9/1/AR2009091500943
.html. [http://perma.cc/ATM-MEXQ.; Sara Murray, Incumbents Face Tough Vote Amid
Bailout Backlash, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2008, 12:Ol AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles
/SB1222 39 9788 5o8 78211 [http://perma.cc/3VTA-TXJG]; and The Curse of Politics, ECONO-
MIST (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/134924o9 [http://perma.cc/JA7M
-E9LH].
22. Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. & BANK ENG. (2012) [hereinafter FDIC WHITE PAPER], www.fdic.gov/about/srac
/2oi2/gsifi.pdf [http://perma.cc/V4G5-FQVP].
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resolution.2" Next, the FDIC would transfer all assets of the parent to a bridge
company and leave the debt behind, creating a well-capitalized bridge company
that could assist the subsidiaries as needed.' Thus, by cancelling the debt of
the parent ("bailing in" that debt), the FDIC could avoid putting operating
subsidiaries into bankruptcy.' Those subsidiaries could continue to operate as
usual, averting a disorderly collapse of a systemically important financial insti-
tution.26
In light of this description from the FDIC of its intended strategy for exer-
cising its OLA powers and the lack of academic literature on this recent pro-
posal, this Note argues that the SPOE strategy inadequately accounts for the
corporate group structure of major financial institutions. First, the SPOE ap-
proach can encourage moral hazard by the creditors of the subsidiaries of a fi-
nancial group: protected by the parent's creditors, the subsidiaries' creditors
may not monitor the financial group's risk-taking activities. While the SPOE
approach would reduce moral hazard at the parent level, theories of corporate
group structure suggest that the parent's creditors would not be able to offset
the moral hazard of the subsidiaries' creditors and that both the overall level of
monitoring and the cost of credit for the financial group would decrease. Se-
cond, based on existing theory and empirical evidence from the 2008 financial
crisis, this Note argues that clear asset segregation among affiliated legal enti-
ties is a key prerequisite to a successful liquidation under the SPOE approach.
This prerequisite, however, is missing in many circumstances. 7 In response to
these weaknesses, this Note puts forward a package of solutions, including an
expanded FDIC backstop for troubled institutions and subsidiary-level stress
testing.
This Note's contributions are twofold. First, it connects the theory of cor-
porate organization with the theory of financial regulation. To date, most of
the scholarly work on the regulation of financial institutions has focused on
those institutions' peculiarities as monolithic financial institutions but not as
corporate groups. The fact that these banks are organized as corporate groups
with hundreds of subsidiaries complicates their resolution even further. From
this complication, this Note uncovers points of weakness in the OLA that have
previously been overlooked. Second, the Note highlights the point that, in a
corporate group structure, creditors of different entities within the group can-
23. Id. at 6. In an FDIC receivership, the FDIC acts in a manner similar to a bankruptcy trustee.
It takes over the powers of the institution's officers, directors, and shareholders, including




27. See infra Part IV.
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not be treated as interchangeable. For example, as noted in Part IV, a creditor
of a subsidiary may be more likely to be bailed out than a creditor of a parent,
so these creditors would not be functionally equivalent. Taking this non-
equivalency as a starting point, this Note evaluates these weaknesses and offers
a more refined assessment of the OLA.
Improving the OLA (and its implementation strategy, the SPOE approach)
should be a high priority even after the financial crisis of 2008, particularly in
light of recurrent instabilities involving financial institutions. For example, in
April and May of 2012, JPMorgan Chase incurred $6.2 billion in trading losses
(known colloquially as the "London Whale" scandal) through its Chief In-
vestment Office, revealing gaps in risk management. 8 Likewise, Citigroup
failed the Federal Reserve's "stress test" in early 2014, with the Federal Reserve
citing "a number of deficiencies in [Citi's] capital planning practices, including
in some areas that had been previously identified by supervisors as requiring
attention, but for which there was not sufficient improvement."29 These weak-
nesses suggest the possibility of another major banking failure in the foreseea-
ble future and the pressing need for the OLA's effective implementation.
The rest of this Note proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the general provi-
sions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SPOE strategy. Part II puts
forward the goals of an optimal resolution mechanism and the standard by
which we can judge the implementation of the OLA. Part III outlines what the
proponents of the SPOE approach have argued are the strengths of the strate-
gy. Part IV asserts that imperfections in the corporate group structure of large
financial institutions can undermine the implementation of the OLA through
the SPOE approach. Lastly, Part V proposes a solution to improve the resolu-
tion mechanism for systemically important financial institutions.
I. ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY (OLA): KEY PROVISIONS
A. Statutory Framework of the Orderly Liquidation Authority
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the FDIC's Orderly Liquidation
Authority. The statute authorizes the FDIC, the Board of Governors of the
a8. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form io-K) 68 (Feb. 28,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/ooooo1961713ooo22/corpiok2o12
.htm [http://perma.cc/D3CG-6YC9]; Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Pays $92o Million To Settle
London Whale Probes, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:oo AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2o13-09-19/jpmorgan-chase-agrees-to-pay-920-million-for-london-whale-loss.html
[http://perma.cc/NBA2-VZZY].
a9. Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2014: Assessment Framework and Results, BD.
GovERNoRs FED. REs. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/CCAR
/March-2o14-Summary-of-Results.htm [http://perma.cc/JR9L-V4X8].
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Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury to put a financial in-
stitution into receivership, in a way modeled on the FDIC's authority to take
over a troubled insured depository institution as its receiver."0 The resolution
process begins when the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
recommend to the Treasury Secretary that a financial institution be put into
receivership, either at their own initiative or at the Secretary's request." At the
FDIC and the Federal Reserve's request, the Treasury Secretary is required to
appoint the FDIC as the institution's receiver if certain conditions are met.32
Once the FDIC becomes the receiver of a failing financial institution, it can
operate and liquidate the firm with near-complete freedom. The FDIC can
"take over the assets and operate the covered financial company with all the
powers of the members or shareholders, the directors, and the officers of the
covered financial company."3 3 It can also appoint itself as the receiver of a fail-
ing subsidiary.34 As the receiver of the seized financial institution, the FDIC
would have extensive latitude in managing the company, including the power
to merge it with another institution,35 to transfer the institution's assets (with-
out any consent or approval),36 to suspend legal actions pending against the
company, 7 to avoid certain transfers, 8 and to disallow claims that are not
30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, S 203,
124 Stat. 1376, 145o-54 (2oo). For a definition of "receivership," see supra note 23.
31. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a). The statute does not specify the sources of information on which
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors must rely in determining the solven-
cy of a financial institution. Under the traditional resolution regime for insured depository
institutions, the FDIC relies on several sources, including a "failing bank letter" from the in-
stitution's chartering authority and data requests sent to a troubled institution. Resolutions
Handbook, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 6-7 (2003), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical
/reshandbook/ch2procs.pdf [http ://perma.cc/3UPJ-XDMV].
32. These conditions are: (i) the institution is in default or in danger of default; (2) resolution
of the failed institution under other applicable law (most likely the Bankruptcy Code) would
have "serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States"; (3) no viable private
sector alternative is available; (4) the side effects of an orderly liquidation under Title II on
various stakeholders -creditors, counterparties, shareholders, and other market partici-
pants- are acceptable; (5) an orderly liquidation under Title II would avoid or mitigate such
adverse effects on various stakeholders of the institution; (6) a federal regulator has ordered
that all convertible debt instruments be converted; and (7) the institution is a "financial
company" under Section 201 of the Act. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b).
33. Id. S 21o(a)(1)(B)(i).
34. Id. § zlo(a)(i)(E)(i).
35. Id. 210(a)(i)(G)(i)(I ) .
36. Id. § 210(a)(1)(G)(i)(II).
37. Id. § 21o(a)(8).
38. Id. § 210(a)(1i).
124:1746 201 5
ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY RESOLUTION
proven to its satisfaction,39 all with limited judicial review.4" In addition, dur-
ing the resolution process, the counterparties' ability to force termination or
liquidation of contracts would be limited, as Title II imposes a one-day stay on
the liquidation of qualified financial contracts, which include repurchase
agreements (repos) and swaps.4' If the FDIC transfers the contracts to a bridge
financial company within that stay period and provides the counterparty with
notice of such a transfer, the counterparty would no longer be able to exercise
its liquidation right."
At the same time, Title II does constrain the FDIC in some important re-
spects. First, the FDIC may not use taxpayer funding in its role as receiver.43 All
funds must come from the disposition of assets or from the Orderly Liquida-
tion Fund (OLF) created through assessments on financial institutions (similar
to the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund). 4 Second, the FDIC may not take an
equity stake in the seized financial institution or any of its subsidiaries. This
provision in effect prohibits the type of bailouts that occurred in 2008 and
2009, in which the federal government took equity positions (often preferred
stock) in ailing financial institutions and essentially became a part-owner of
these firms.46
These powers granted to the FDIC -along with the restrictions placed on
it -show that the focus of the OLA is on enabling swift resolution of financial
institutions by removing obstacles to the FDIC's role as the receiver while pre-
venting ad hoc bailouts of the type that occurred in 20o8 and 2009. For exam-
ple, the limitation on judicial review,47 immunity for directors who acquiesce to
the Treasury, 48 and the FDIC's authority to repudiate contracts unilaterally49
would pave the way for a quick receivership process. Therefore, in principle the
OLA would prevent the failure of a major financial institution from developing
into a system-wide catastrophe.
39. Id. S 210(a)(3)(D).
40. Id. 5 210(a)(9)(D).
41. Normally, under the Bankruptcy Code, counterparties can terminate or liquidate those con-
tracts immediately. 11 U.S.C. §§ 559-60 (2012).
42. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(C)(1O).
43. Id. § 214(c).
44. Id. § 214(b).
45. Id. 5 2o6(6).
46. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 373-76; Am. Int'l Grp., Current
Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 22, 20o8), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272
/0000950123o8o1496/y71452e8vk.htm [http ://perma.cc/2SsV-EDG3].
47. Dodd-Frank Act § 21o(a)(9)(D).
48. Id. 5 207.
49. Id. § 210(C).
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B. The FDIC's Roadmap for Implementation of the OLA: Single Point of Entry
(SPOE)
Despite its ambitions, the OLA cannot succeed without an appropriate im-
plementation scheme. Of course, the FDIC has a long history of resolving in-
sured depository institutions; since its inception in 1933, the FDIC has resolved
more than three thousand failed depository institutions."s The vast majority of
these, however, were small banks without complex balance sheets."' The FDIC
has resolved only one bank with more than $ioo billion in assets: Washington
Mutual, which had assets of $307 billion when it failed in September 2008.2
By contrast, today there are twenty-five bank holding companies (and many
other non-BHC (bank holding company) financial institutions, such as AIG)
with assets over $1oo billion; the largest bank holding company in the United
States, JPMorgan Chase, has $2.5 trillion in assets, more than eight times the
assets of Washington Mutual.. 3 The bank failures with which the FDIC is fa-
miliar are quite small in comparison, 4 and the FDIC's expertise in resolving
large, complex financial institutions may be limited."5
50. Failures & Assistance Transactions, FDIC HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON BANKING,
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/ [http://perma.cc/WAE2-PZUT] (follow "Failures and Assis-
tance Transactions" hyperlink; then specify under Transaction Type "All Failures" between
the effective dates of 1934 until 2013).
si. Of the 3,465 banks resolved by the FDIC between 1934 and 2013, only 299 (8.6%) had assets
over $1 billion (in 2014 dollars, adjusted for inflation) at the time of failure. Id.; Federal Re-
serve Economic Data: Consumer Price Indexfor All Urban Consumers: All Items, FED. RES. BANK
ST. LouIs, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL [http://perma.cc/4HU2
-Z39 N].
S2. Failures & Assistance Transactions, supra note 5o.
53. Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $1o Billion, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION
COUNCIL NAT'L INFO. CENTER, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top5oForm.aspx
[http://perma.cc/LTB4-CPFN].
54. Another problem is balance sheet complexity. For example, Washington Mutual was a tradi-
tional depository institution with deposits constituting the majority of its liabilities and
loans constituting the majority of its assets. Washington Mutual Inc., Annual Report
Amendment No. I (Form lo-K/A) I1 (May 22, 2OO8), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar
/data/933136/oooo47469o8oo687o/a2185889zlo-ka.htm [http://perma.cc/N2FY-PLNZ].
In comparison, Goldman Sachs's liabilities are largely funded by repurchase agreements and
unsecured wholesale borrowings, and the vast majority of its assets are securities and finan-
cial instruments rather than simple loans. Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report
(Form lo-K) 119 (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982
/ooo119312 513o8 54 74/d446679dlok.htm [http://perma.ccBX8V-MJ4S].
55. Moreover, the FDIC almost always uses a "purchase-and-assumption" strategy in resolving
failed banks, whereby assets and liabilities are sold to another depository institution. Fail-
ures & Assistance Transactions, supra note 5o. When the largest banks fail, however, it is
unclear whether this "purchase-and-assumption" strategy would work given that there
would be few buyers large enough to take on the banks' assets and liabilities.
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Recognizing this limited experience, the FDIC (along with the Bank of
England) released a December 2012 white paper detailing its blueprint for im-
plementing the OLA. 6 This strategy was memorialized in a December 2013 no-
tice and request for comment from the FDIC, which largely mirrored the 2012
white paper. 7 Called the "Single Point of Entry" resolution strategy, the
FDIC's plan calls for receivership of the parent-and only the parent-in the
event of a financial group failure. 8 The FDIC would only "enter" at the top
and leave the subsidiaries to operate as usual.5 9 Since the parent is often a hold-
ing company without significant trading operations, putting the parent into
receivership would not affect the day-to-day activities of the financial group. In
principle, systemic risk would be minimized since the subsidiaries would con-
tinue operating normally and trading with their counterparties. By contrast, in
a multiple point of entry approach, the resolution authority would have to put
each and every endangered subsidiary into receivership; those subsidiaries
would face substantial obstacles to normal operation, in turn threatening other
financial institutions that rely on those subsidiaries.
In theory, an SPOE resolution of a systemically important financial institu-
tion would proceed as follows: upon the Treasury Secretary's determination
that the institution should be put into receivership, the FDIC would take con-
trol of the parent company of the financial group while the subsidiaries re-
mained in operation.60 The FDIC would then create a bridge financial holding
company pursuant to its powers under Title 11.6' The bridge company would
act as a buyer, akin to the acquirer in a "purchase-and-assumption" transaction
typical for the FDIC. 6' Assets of the old parent-which would consist mostly, if
not entirely, of equity stakes in the subsidiaries -would be transferred to the
bridge company.6 3
After the assets are transferred, the FDIC would conduct a valuation of the
transferred assets. Based on its valuation, the FDIC would determine the ap-
propriate level of liabilities for the parent and write down subordinated unse-
56. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22.
. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter SPOE Notice].
58. Id. at 76,616.
59. Id.
60. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6; SPOE Notice, supra note 57, at 76,616.
61. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
21o(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1496-1504 (2010),
6z. In a "purchase-and-assumption" transaction, a healthy bank purchases some of the assets of
a failed bank and assumes some or all of the liabilities of the target as well. FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., supra note 31, at 19.
63. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6; SPOE Notice, supra note 57, at 76,617-18.
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cured debt to reduce liabilities to that appropriate level.6 4 Since assets would
remain the same and liabilities would have decreased, the bridge company
would have more equity than the old parent did. 6, In exchange for the cancella-
tion of their existing claims, the debt holders would receive equity or converti-
ble subordinated debt (that is, convertible to equity) in the bridge company.66
In virtually all scenarios, the existing stockholders would be wiped out, and in
many cases, the subordinated creditors of the parent would see at least some of
their claims converted to equity.67 Thus, in effect, the FDIC would recapitalize
the old parent company by converting some of its more junior liabilities into
equity. 68 After the parent is recapitalized, it would be able to support its sub-
sidiaries as necessary and return to normal operations.
As an example, consider a two-tier financial group. The sole subsidiary has
assets of $ioo, no external liabilities, and $1oo in equity, all held by the parent.
The parent has assets of $1oo (equity in the subsidiary), external debt of $90,
and equity (held by the public) of $io. Furthermore, assume that the parent's
debt of $90 is composed of $So in senior debt and $40 in subordinated debt.
Therefore, the financial group on a consolidated basis has assets of $2oo, liabil-
ities of $9o, and equity of $i0 (since intercompany holdings cancel out).
When the subsidiary incurs a loss of $20, its assets decline to $8o. As a re-
sult, the equity stake in the subsidiary also declines to $80, and so do the assets
of the parent, because the sole asset of the parent is an equity stake in the sub-
sidiary. Since the group as a whole still has liabilities of $90, its liabilities then
exceed its assets, rendering it insolvent. Under SPOE resolution, the parent-
and only the parent-will be put into resolution. The parent's assets (worth
$80) will be transferred to the bridge holding company set up by the FDIC. If
the FDIC determines that the appropriate capital ratio is lO%, then it will
transfer $72 in liabilities to the bridge holding company as well, with priority
given to the senior creditors. Therefore, the transferred liabilities will consist of
$50 in senior debt and $22 in subordinated debt. The subordinated creditors
will see their claims written down from $40 to $22. In exchange, they will re-
ceive the entire equity stake in the bridge holding company, worth $8. The old
equity will not be transferred, and the old equityholders' claims will be worth-
less. Consequently, the parent's senior creditors will not take any losses; the
parent's subordinated creditors will take $1o in losses (they originally held $40
64. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 13-14; SPOE Notice, supra note 57, at 76,618-19.
65. Assets always equal liabilities plus shareholders' equity.
66. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6; SPOE Notice, supra note 57, at 76,618.
67. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6.
68. It is important to note, however, that without sufficient unsecured debt at the parent level to
"bail in," it may be necessary to put the subsidiaries with the greatest losses into resolution
as well.
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in subordinated debt and now hold $22 in subordinated debt and $8 in equi-
ty); and the parent's equityholders will take $io in losses (they held $io in eq-
uity, all of which will be wiped out).
Several important aspects of the SPOE approach are designed to minimize
the impact on operating subsidiaries. First, the SPOE approach would prevent
a mass termination of contracts at the subsidiary level. Since the subsidiaries
would remain in operation, their counterparties would have little incentive to
terminate their contracts. If the counterparties seek to terminate their contracts
with the subsidiaries, moreover, the FDIC has the power to enforce those
agreements notwithstanding any counterparty termination rights. 6' Through
this mechanism, the FDIC would be able to save the subsidiaries from suffer-
ing massive losses from the termination of contracts and falling into insolvency
as Lehman Brothers' subsidiaries did in 2008. Second, the FDIC's white paper
notes that liquidity pressures would be alleviated through intercompany loans
from the recapitalized parent, through the open market (as the recapitalization
would restore confidence in the financial markets), or through loans from the
OLF.7 ° By providing liquidity and preventing the termination of parent-
guaranteed contracts, the FDIC would allow the subsidiaries to operate with-
out significant obstacles.
II. GOALS OF AN OPTIMAL RESOLUTION STRATEGY
To evaluate Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDIC's SPOE strategy,
it is helpful first to delineate the goals that an optimal resolution strategy
should achieve and the criteria by which to judge the OLA and SPOE.
A logical starting point of this exercise is the problem that the OLA is at-
tempting to solve: the "too-big-to-fail" problem and the associated issues of
moral hazard and systemic risk.7 Too-big-to-fail institutions are firms that
pose significant risk to the overall financial system because of their size, com-
plexity, or interconnectedness.' As a result of the negative externalities (sys-
temic risk) that these institutions pose, policymakers cannot afford to let them
69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, S
210(C)(1O), (16), i4 Stat. 1376, 1491-93 (201O).
70. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6-7, 10-11.
71. The Dodd-Frank Act's preamble notes that it is enacted "[t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system,
to end 'too big to fail', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes." Dodd-Frank Act
pmbl.
72. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement Before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 19 (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/testimony/bernanke2oloo9o2a.pdf [http ://perma.cc/MU 5U-PFKV].
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fail lest their failure jeopardize the whole financial system. Knowing that poli-
cymakers will act to bail out these institutions in a crisis, the creditors of a firm
that is too big to fail may have little incentive to monitor the institution's activ-
ities, and the firm itself lacks any incentive to curb its risk-taking." This gener-
ates a vicious cycle, whereby a too-big-to-fail institution engages in excessive
risk-taking, enlarges its balance sheet, and becomes even more too-big-to-
fail. 74
As the former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has described,'5
too-big-to-fail institutions impose three costs on the broader economy. First is
the moral hazard problem: because of the expectation of a government bailout,
firms will engage in more risk-taking than is socially optimal.r6 Second, the
too-big-to-fail problem puts smaller firms at a disadvantage by forcing them to
compete with bigger institutions that have a lower cost of funding due to the
prospect of a government bailout.' Third, as financial institutions become
bigger, riskier, and more interconnected, financial crises become even more de-
structive, increasing the costs on the overall financial system and the real econ-
omy.78
An optimal resolution mechanism should address the too-big-to-fail prob-
lem on two fronts. First, it should impose costs on those responsible for the
failure of an institution - for example, executives and equityholders - as a pro-
spective mechanism for deterring excessive risk-taking. Second, a resolution
mechanism should seek to minimize the impact of a firm's failure on the overall
financial system. This goal encompasses a variety of factors, the most im-
portant of which are speed, stability, and certainty. Speed is important because
failed financial institutions' assets are essentially "melting ice cubes."79 Failed
financial institutions' assets can depreciate drastically soon after failure because
counterparties are often unwilling to do business with a firm in resolution,
leading to destruction of franchise value. Moreover, because financial instru-
ments fluctuate in value significantly over short periods of time, it is important
to mitigate the depreciation in value during the restructuring process. Speed
works hand-in-hand with stability: if creditors and counterparties reach hap-
hazardly for the assets of the failed institution, the consequent unwinding of
positions (often at fire sale prices) can cripple the balance sheet of the firm in




77. Id. at 21.
78. Id.
79. See Comment Letter from the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkt. Ass'n and the Clearing House Ass'n
L.L.C. to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., at A- 5 (May 23, 2011).
176o
124:1746 201 5
ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY RESOLUTION
resolution.s Finally, creditors require certainty in the implementation of an ef-
fective resolution: a lack of confidence can lead to contagion in the financial
markets. Uncertainty over a systemically important financial institution's reso-
lution can ruin market participants' risk appetite.
III. ADVANTAGES OF THE OLA AND THE SPOE STRATEGY
The proponents of the SPOE strategy usually tout three advantages of the
SPOE approach: speed, reduction in moral hazard, and stability. These ad-
vantages are outlined in this Part. Part IV then challenges the validity of some
of these advantages.
A. The SPOE Approach Enables Quick Resolution of a Large Financial Group
Proponents of the SPOE approach often argue that it allows for quick reso-
lution of a large financial group. Under a multiple point of entry approach, all
assets of the financial group are subject to resolution, so they must be either
transferred or liquidated. In a major financial group, this is a daunting task.
For example, Lehman Brothers had 930,000 open derivative contracts at the
time of its failure." Moreover, a financial group may have hundreds of subsidi-
aries, many of which are intertwined in a complex network of cross-stream,
upstream, and downstream guarantees."s As an example, at the end of 2013,
JPMorgan Chase had approximately five hundred subsidiaries, many of which
Bo. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman's Chaotic Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2oo8, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123oo91677oo38267.html
[http://perma.cc/GA4H-L3JQ]. As an example, upon Lehman's bankruptcy filing, approx-
imately 733,000 of Lehman's 930,ooo derivative contracts were terminated, resulting in a
massive destruction of value. See Too Big To Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law
in Financial Regulation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, iiith Cong. 72 (2009) [hereinafter Too Big to Fail] (testi-
mony of Harvey R. Miller, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LUP).
81. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Toward Build-
ing a More Effective Resolution Regime: Progress and Challenges (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo2o131ol8a.htm [http://perma.cc
/GF3B-FF2P].
82. See Too Big To Fail, supra note 8o, at 72.
83. With an upstream guarantee, a subsidiary guarantees its parent's obligations. With a down-
stream guarantee, a parent guarantees its subsidiary's obligations. With a cross-stream
guarantee, one subsidiary guarantees the obligations of another subsidiary under common
control.
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were incorporated in foreign jurisdictions. 4 The multiple point of entry strate-
gy would require the FDIC to assess whether each subsidiary should be put in-
to resolution, transfer all assets to a bridge company, and resolve or disallow
claims against those subsidiaries. This process would cause significant delays at
a time when such delays would be catastrophic.8s
In contrast, the SPOE strategy can concentrate the FDIC's resources at the
top and allow the parent entity to recapitalize and support its subsidiaries as
they face problems. The FDIC would only need to determine whether one
company-the parent-needs to be put into resolution. Once it is determined
that the parent is not viable and should be resolved, the FDIC can simply create
one bridge company, transfer the parent's assets to that company, recapitalize
it, and provide support from the Orderly Liquidation Fund as necessary. These
tasks can be accomplished within a much shorter time frame, as they only in-
volve the parent. The simplicity of the SPOE approach would allow for quick
implementation during a crisis, helping to limit the spillover effect from the
failure of a systemically important financial institution.
B. The SPOE Approach Reduces Moral Hazard for the Parent's Creditors and
Shareholders
According to the proponents of the SPOE approach, the strategy also re-
duces moral hazard at the parent level. Under the model of recapitalization de-
veloped by the FDIC, the bridge financial company cannot be recapitalized us-
ing taxpayer funding.8 6 With this prohibition, the FDIC would most likely
wipe out the equity in the parent and leave behind a substantial amount of un-
secured liabilities in order to recapitalize the parent. 8, Since all assets would be
transferred to the bridge company, the equity and the liabilities left behind in
the parent-now a shell company-would be worthless. In exchange, the sub-
ordinated (and in some cases, senior) unsecured debt holders who saw their
84. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form lo-K) 365-73 (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/ooooo1 9 61714ooo289/corplok2ol3.htm [http://perma.cc
/9CPG-YVC2].
85. Timing is particularly crucial in the case of financial institutions, since creditors can pull
their funding extremely rapidly. For example, after Lehman's failure triggered a panic in the
financial markets, Morgan Stanley lost $31 billion in funding from repo lenders within one
week, amounting to nearly a quarter of its total liquidity pool. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT, supra note 9, at 362.
86. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
2o6(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1459 (2010).
87. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 12-13.
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claims written down would receive equity and convertible debt in the new
holding company.88
This process effectively amounts to a "bail-in," whereby the company is re-
capitalized without infusion of capital from outside sources.8" As all assets are
transferred, the asset side of the parent's balance sheet would remain the same,
but the liability and equity side would be restructured to deleverage the institu-
tion.9" The shareholders and the unsecured creditors of the parent would thus
bear the loss from the company's failure.
Of course, even in a government-sponsored bailout, the shareholders are
often, if not always, wiped out.91 Nonetheless, the fact that unsecured creditors
take a loss upon the holding company's failure is highly important from an in-
centives perspective. Ex ante, creditors have a very different risk-profile than
shareholders do. Shareholders prefer risk-taking because they receive the un-
limited upside from risky investments, while creditors are structurally risk-
averse because their upside is limited by the principal they are owed.92 Yet if
the prospect of a bailout removes the creditors' downside risk, creditors' incen-
tive to rein in the company's risk-taking evaporates. Furthermore, if monitor-
ing is costly, and such costs are shouldered exclusively by individual creditors,
creditors would prefer to avoid those costs, even if the social benefits from
monitoring exceed the costs. Such moral hazard, enabled by a wealth transfer
from taxpayers, would lead to investments that are riskier than the socially op-
timal level.
If, however, the government avoids this wealth transfer from taxpayers to
creditors (and indirectly to the shareholders by lowering their cost of funding),
88. Id. at 6.
89. While the FDIC White Paper itself does not use the term "bail-in" in the context of the U.S.
recapitalization model, commentators often call the recapitalization process a "bail-in." See,
e.g., Jim Fuchs, From Bailouts to Bail-Ins: Will the Single-Point-of-Entry Concept End "Too Big
To Fail"?, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis (2013), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications
/cb/articles/?id=241o [http://perma.cc/LW7Q-R9U2].
go. This deleveraging process helps stabilize a financial institution. Debt-particularly in the
form of short-term loans -is destabilizing in that it has fixed repayment amounts and credi-
tors can pull their funding by refusing to roll over their loans. In contrast, equity does not
have fixed repayment amounts, and equityholders cannot demand repayment of their fund-
ing. Therefore, by deleveraging (that is, substituting equity for debt), the financial institu-
tion can emerge as a more stable entity.
gi. For example, Bear Stearns shareholders received only $io per share in the firm's forced
merger with JPMorgan Chase, even though its stock had been trading at just shy of $17o a
year before the merger. FINANcIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 282, 290. Simi-
larly, in the bailouts of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG, shareholders were all but wiped
out. Id. at 320; Am. Int'l Grp., supra note 46.
92. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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the creditors would be exposed to the downside risk of reckless debtor invest-
ments. This exposure would incentivize creditors to price default risk into the
rates they charge and to monitor risky activities, aligning the interests of socie-
ty with the interests of the financial institution as a whole.
C. The SPOE Approach Maintains Stability While a Firm Is in Resolution
Perhaps the greatest strength of the SPOE strategy is that it would leave the
majority of a failing company undisturbed and maintain overall stability and
continuation of operations. Instability can produce negative externalities in
three ways. First, the disorderly unwinding of contract positions can destroy
the value of a firm's assets, reducing recoveries for its creditors and counterpar-
ties (who are often financial institutions themselves).93 Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the SPOE strategy can remedy this problem by halting a disor-
derly liquidation of assets. Since a financial group's broker-dealer subsidiaries
would not be in resolution under SPOE, the derivative contracts and other
qualified financial contracts in which subsidiaries are engaged would not be
subject to automatic termination by reason of counterparty default.94 The
failed financial group would be able to maintain its portfolio of qualified finan-
cial contracts, avoiding the type of instability that cost Lehman creditors bil-
lions of dollars.
Another possible source of spillover -ways in which one firm's troubles can
affect other firms - is a fire sale of assets. As asset prices fall, other financial in-
stitutions that hold those assets would see the value of their assets fall as well.95
Since liabilities would remain the same, such a decline in the asset value would
lead to a corresponding decline in shareholders' equity. In order to avoid being
undercapitalized, these institutions would be forced to sell their assets, putting
further downward pressure on prices and continuing the downward cycle.
93. See, e.g., Amias Gerety, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Insts., U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
Remarks Before the Exchequer Club (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/j12638.aspx [http://perma.cc/R3G 4 -H3AE ] ("The decision to
terminate [derivative contracts] based on an exogenous event, while perhaps individually
rational, destroys value for the individual counterparty, the failing firm and other stakehold-
ers.").
94. Even if the contracts are guaranteed by the parent or have cross-default provisions, under
Tide II, upon the FDIC's appointment as the receiver of a failed institution, the counterpar-
ties of derivative contracts or other qualified financial contracts cannot exercise their termi-
nation rights until 5:oo p.m. the next day and cannot exercise their rights at all if those con-
tracts are transferred before the 5:oo p.m. deadline. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 5 210(C)(1o)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (2010).
95. While most physical assets are carried on firms' balance sheets at historical cost and thus are
not affected by a subsequent decrease in market price, financial instruments are "marked to
market," and their carrying value is affected by the market price of those instruments.
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The OLA and SPOE can preempt this fire sale by preventing a sell-off trig-
gered by a major institution's failure. Like the counterparties to derivatives, the
counterparties to repo and other securities contracts are not permitted to liqui-
date and seize the collateral until 5:00 p.m. the day after the FDIC is appointed
as the receiver. If the FDIC transfers those contracts before that deadline, the
counterparties cannot exercise their liquidation and foreclosure rights at all. 6
Moreover, the SPOE approach means that subsidiaries with deteriorating in-
vestment positions would remain in business and be able to slowly push those
assets off their balance sheets instead of liquidating them all at once. Lastly,
this process would be facilitated by the support that the subsidiaries can receive
from the parent, which in turn can obtain assistance from the FDIC and the
Orderly Liquidation Fund.97 Thus, as long as temporary assistance continues
flowing from the FDIC, the subsidiaries would be able to liquidate their in-
vestments in a slow but orderly manner and remain in operation.
The last source of systemic risk from instability is interruption of vital ser-
vices such as financing, insurance, and brokerage. For example, AIG posed
massive systemic risk because its failure would have cut off countless non-
financial and financial firms from insurance services. 98 The SPOE strategy can
mitigate this problem by allowing the subsidiaries that provide vital services to
continue to operate during the group's resolution, preventing spillover effects
to non-financial industries.
IV. CORPORATE GROUP STRUCTURE AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
OLA
Part III identified several advantages of the SPOE approach to the resolu-
tion of large financial institutions. All of these advantages, however, have one
commonality: they assume an optimal corporate group structure. That is, they
assume (i) that the corporate group has clear dividing lines among different
constituent legal entities and (2) that the parent is functionally equivalent to
the subsidiaries in terms of the ease of supervision of the firm's risk-taking ac-
tivities. In other words, they assume that the parent company's creditors can
monitor the group's risk-taking activities just as well as the subsidiaries' credi-
tors can.
The reality is different. Often a corporate group does not have clear divid-
ing lines among different constituent legal entities. Because, in most cases,
96. Dodd-FrankAct S 210(c)(8)(F).
97. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6-7.
98. The Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, noth Cong. 14 (2008) (testimony of Eric P. Dinallo, Superintendent, N.Y. State
Ins. Dep't).
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firms only have to report consolidated financial data, the dividing lines often
become blurred. Furthermore, the holding company's creditors may not be
functional equivalents of the subsidiaries' creditors in terms of their monitor-
ing capability.
This Part argues that these imperfections in corporate group structure may
lead to cracks in the implementation of the OLA through the SPOE approach.
These weaknesses might arise in three ways: (1) since monitoring capability of
the parent's creditors is weaker than that of the subsidiaries' creditors, moral
hazard can increase on net; (2) since OLA resolution carries with it certain ad-
verse consequences for the financial firm (such as automatic replacement of
management), a financial firm may shift liabilities to the subsidiaries and force
the FDIC to bail out the company instead of resolving it through the OLA; and
(3) implementation of the SPOE approach, which essentially relies on a quar-
antine of the parent and problematic subsidiaries, may not be possible when
the dividing lines among different constituent legal entities are unclear.
A. The SPOE Strategy Increases the Moral Hazard of the Subsidiaries' Creditors
From the perspective of corporate group structure, the first problem with
the SPOE strategy is that it may encourage moral hazard for subsidiary credi-
tors. Earlier, this Note addressed how the SPOE strategy would reduce moral
hazard at the parent level. 99 By forcing the conversion of the parent company's
debt to equity in the bridge company, the SPOE strategy would motivate credi-
tors of the parent legal entity to monitor the financial group's risky activities.
The creditors, who are structurally more risk-averse than the stockholders,
would therefore provide a counterbalance to the risk-seeking behavior of the
stockholders, who may otherwise be inclined to take excessive risks knowing
that they will reap the upside benefits but will bear limited losses. '
Unfortunately, the flip side applies to the counterparties and creditors of
the subsidiaries: the SPOE strategy can increase moral hazard of the subsidiar-
ies' creditors and counterparties. Under the existing bankruptcy regime, the
parent's creditors and the subsidiaries' creditors share the burden of a failed in-
vestment. As one subsidiary's asset value declines, the equity stake in that sub-
sidiary depreciates as well. Since the corporate parent's assets include an equity
stake in its subsidiaries, this depreciation leads to a decline in the parent's asset
value. If the parent's assets are not sufficient to repay the parent's creditors, the
parent's creditors will take the first losses, which are limited to the difference
99. See supra Part III.B.
ioo. Limited liability is key to this asymmetry, since the most that the shareholders can lose is
their equity investment in the firm. On the other hand, there is no limit to the amount of
money that they stand to earn if risky investments prove to be successful.
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between the parent's equity stake in other subsidiaries and the principal
amount of the parent's debt. As the troubled subsidiary's asset value declines
even further, and it becomes insolvent, the subsidiary's creditors begin to take
losses. Overall losses from the troubled subsidiary's failure are thus split be-
tween that subsidiary's creditors and the parent's creditors.
On the other hand, under the SPOE approach, the parent's creditors would
bear all losses until they are wiped out. At the core of the SPOE approach is the
conversion of debt to equity at the parent level, which would enable the bridge
company to provide assistance to its subsidiaries.' For example, the recapital-
ized parent could forgive intercompany loans that a subsidiary owes to the par-
ent, increasing the subsidiary's equity level.'0 2 Even if the subsidiaries were the
source of the financial group's plight, they could remain in operation with the
parent's assistance and continue to meet their obligations to their counterpar-
ties and creditors.0 3 If the losses are bigger than the parent's creditors can ab-
sorb, the subsidiaries' creditors and counterparties may take a loss,104 but the
subsidiaries' creditors would only take a loss after the parent's creditors are
wiped out.
To see this, consider a simple corporate group structure, with one parent
(P) and two subsidiaries (Si and S2). Assume that each subsidiary's assets are
worth $1oo, with $So in liabilities and $So in equity (held entirely by the par-
ent). Therefore, the parent's assets (equity stake in the subsidiaries) are worth
$1oo. Furthermore, assume that the parent's assets are funded with $80 in lia-
bilities and $20 in equity. On a consolidated scale, the company has $18o in li-
abilities ($5o each in two subsidiaries and $80 in the parent) and $20 in equity
from outside investors (all at the parent level), with a capital ratio of lo%.
When S1 suffers a catastrophic loss of $75 and fails, the parent's equity
stake in the subsidiary is wiped out first. However, since Si is insolvent, its
creditors also take a loss, only receiving $25. The parent's assets are reduced to
$50, making it insolvent as well, since its liabilities ($80) exceed assets ($50).
l1. See FDICWHTrE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6.
102. Fin. Regulatory Reform Initiative, Too Big To Fail: The Path to a Solution, BIPARTISAN POL'Y
CENTER 31 (May 2013), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files
/TooBigToFail.pdf [http://perma.cc/4T73-V6YP?type=pdf].
103. There may be several reasons why a parent would keep a failing subsidiary in business. For
example, putting a subsidiary in bankruptcy leads to embarrassment and reputational loss
for the corporate group, so as long as the cost of keeping the subsidiary in business does not
exceed the reputational loss, a parent may choose to keep a subsidiary in business.
1o4. Improving Cross Border Resolution To Better Protect Taxpayers and the Economy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. and Int'l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Ur-
ban Affairs, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of James R. Wigand, Director, Office of Com-
plex Financial Institutions) [hereinafter Wigand], http://www.fdic.gov/news/news
/speeches/spmay1513_2.pdf [http ://perma.cc/NEY2-PRPL?type=pdf].
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As a result, the parent's creditors take a loss as well, seeing their claims written
down to $50 (with a loss of $30). The total loss of $7S is broken down as fol-
lows: $25 by Si's creditors, $30 by the parent's creditors, and $20 by the par-
ent's equityholders.
Under SPOE, however, the losses would be distributed differently. On a
consolidated basis, the group would be severely undercapitalized, with assets of
$12 5 and liabilities of $18o. Assuming that the appropriate capital ratio is lo%
(as before), the FDIC would write down the total liabilities to $112.5, with the
parent's creditors taking the first losses, and the parent's creditors would see
their claims written down from $80 to $12.5. They would also receive $12.5 in
equity, but that would still give them $5 in losses. After this process, the par-
ent can make further equity investment in S1, allowing that troubled subsidiary
to remain alive. Under SPOE, therefore, the total loss of $75 would be distrib-
uted as follows: $55 by the parent's creditors and $20 by the parent's equi-
tyholders.
In effect, when a financial group fails, the FDIC would subordinate the un-
secured liabilities of the parent to the liabilities of the subsidiaries.' 5 Such sub-
ordination reduces the risk of loss to the creditors of the subsidiaries because
the FDIC would not impose losses on the subsidiaries' creditors unless and un-
til the parent's unsecured liabilities are fully converted into equity, even if the
,,6losses originated-as they usually do-from the subsidiaries. With a lower
risk of loss, the subsidiary creditors would have less incentive to monitor the
risk-taking activities of the subsidiaries. The parent creditors would in effect be
providing a subsidy to the subsidiary creditors and freeing the subsidiary credi-
tors from the costs of monitoring. 10 7
Some argue that such subordination is not a problem because the parent
creditors can simply charge higher interest rates ex ante on their loans to com-
pensate for their higher risk of loss. s Yet the moral hazard problem associated
with financial institutions includes not only artificially low pricing of credit
(which the above argument addresses) but also lack of monitoring by the
creditors. While an extension of this argument means that the parent creditors
1o5. The FDIC white paper does not mention a "write-down" of secured liabilities, and the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
210(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1477 (2010), protects secured claims. FDIC White Paper, supra note
22,
io6. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6.
107. One possible counterargument is that parent creditors will demand a higher interest rate to
compensate for this "subsidy." However, as noted in the subsequent paragraph, the increase
in the interest rate would only partially offset the increase in moral hazard.
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will have a greater incentive to monitor the financial group to compensate for
the lower monitoring incentive of the subsidiary creditors, the parent creditors
cannot monitor the risk-taking activities of the financial group as well as the
subsidiary creditors can.' 09 The parent creditors have to monitor a wide range
of activities of the group, while the subsidiary creditors can focus on the nar-
rower set of activities that each subsidiary engages in."' Hence, the increased
motivation of the parent creditors to monitor the activities of the financial
group would not be able to fully compensate for the reduced level of monitor-
ing by the subsidiary creditors. As a result, the subordination of the parent
creditors to the subsidiary creditors would increase moral hazard overall and
allow risk levels beyond the socially optimal level.
B. The SPOE Strategy Encourages Financial Groups To Shift Liabilities to
Their Subsidiaries
The SPOE strategy relies heavily on the assumption that the unsecured lia-
bilities of the parent company will be sufficient to cover the losses of the finan-
cial group, especially given that a write-down of unsecured liabilities would be
easier than a write-down of secured liabilities."' For example, the FDIC notes
that in the United States, the parent typically issues most of the external unse-
cured debt of a financial group, giving the parent sufficient loss-absorbing ca-
pacity.1
2
However, the imperfections in the corporate group structure of large finan-
cial institutions have perverse behavioral implications. The SPOE strategy can
encourage financial groups to change their intra-group capital structure and
issue more debt at the subsidiary level, rather than at the parent level, in order
to undermine the implementation of the SPOE approach. This incentive may
be particularly strong since an OLA resolution would mean the automatic oust-
er of current management"3 and loss to the parent's creditors. As the Bipartisan
Policy Center has remarked, the SPOE strategy would increase the risk of loss
to the parent's creditors who will demand higher interest rates to compen-
1o9. Since parent creditors would want to monitor the subsidiaries vigorously but cannot, this
problem is distinct from the traditional problem of reduced incentive (as opposed to capaci-
ty) to monitor the financial group.
110. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHi. L. REv.
499,516-17 (1976).
iii. FDIC WI-iTE PAPER, supra note 22, at 12. Write-down means that the face value of the claims
would be reduced.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 5 206,
124 Stat. 1376, 1459 (2010).
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sate.'14 Given this change in the interest rate, a financial group can lower its
cost of debt by originating its unsecured loans from the subsidiaries rather than
from the parent.
There are counterarguments to the proposition that a financial group
would move its liabilities to its subsidiaries. First, as a financial group moves
its liabilities to the subsidiaries, the cost of credit incurred by the group may
not decrease because a smaller asset pool is backing each loan. The creditors of
the parent have recourse to a diversified asset pool, mitigating the risk of a cat-
astrophic loss, while the creditors of a subsidiary only have recourse to special-
ized assets. In case of a downturn in the specific sector that the subsidiary op-
erates in (assuming that other subsidiaries operate in different sectors), the
possibility of a catastrophic loss is greater since there is no diversification of
risk. Accordingly, debt issued at the subsidiary level requires a higher interest
rate than debt issued at the parent level, and a financial group would not be
able to lower its cost of credit by issuing external debt at the subsidiary level.
This argument, however, is undermined by the fact that corporate groups
utilize cross-stream and downstream guarantees extensively."1 As noted above,
with a downstream guarantee, the parent guarantees performance of a subsidi-
ary's obligations, and with a cross-stream guarantee, a subsidiary guarantees
performance of another subsidiary's obligations.,, 6 With cross-stream and
downstream guarantees, a subsidiary creditor effectively has recourse to all the
assets of the group. If the debtor subsidiary itself fails, the creditor can pursue
the assets of the other subsidiaries and the parent who have guaranteed the
loan. In effect, the creditor of a subsidiary obligation guaranteed by the parent
or another subsidiary has recourse to multiple layers of assets, increasing the
probability of recovering the creditor's claims. Subsidiary creditors' access to
the diversity of the corporate group's asset pool means that borrowing at the
subsidiary level may not always be more expensive than borrowing at the par-
ent level.
Second, one may also argue that the subsidiaries' debt will become more
expensive as a financial group moves its liabilities away from the parent be-
cause there would be a smaller amount of unsecured liabilities at the parent
level that can be written down to recapitalize the financial group and the sub-
sidiaries' debt may bear losses as a result in an SPOE resolution. This position
is correct if it were assumed that, in the absence of a sufficient cushion, the
subsidiary debt would be written down in the same way as the parent debt. In
such a scenario, it does not matter where the financial group puts its liabilities;
114. See Kern, supra note Io8.
11s. See Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 605, 607
(2011).
116. See supra note 83.
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a certain amount of the debt will be written down in both cases, and the overall
credit premium should be the same.
Despite this equivalency argument, there is reason to believe that the sub-
sidiary debt would not be written down in the same way if there is insufficient
unsecured debt at the parent level. Without sufficient unsecured debt at the
parent level, it would be necessary to put the subsidiaries with the greatest
losses into resolution, repeating the "bail-in" process for each subsidiary. "7
This effectively turns the SPOE strategy into a multiple point of entry ap-
proach, complicating the resolution process immensely. The simplicity offered
by SPOE would be replaced by the complexity of maintaining the vital subsidi-
aries' operation. As complications mount and spillover effects become more
likely, the possibility of a bailout increases."' As Joshua Mitts points out,
Dodd-Frank makes bailouts more difficult but not impossible." 9 When resolu-
tion becomes too difficult and complicated as a result of the financial institu-
tion's moving its liabilities to its subsidiaries, banking regulators may be forced
to cut the Gordian Knot by bailing out the financial group. The increased
probability of a bailout when liabilities are pushed to subsidiaries would lower
the expected losses to subsidiary creditors. Under this model, subsidiary credi-
tors would not increase their interest rates as much as they would without the
possibility of a bailout. This would drive a wedge between the cost of capital
for a top-heavy firm (one that issues most of its liabilities from the parent) and
the cost of capital for a bottom-heavy firm (one that issues most of its liabilities
from the subsidiaries) Financial groups may attempt to take advantage of this
differential by moving their liabilities to the subsidiaries.
Furthermore, this phenomenon has been empirically demonstrated. When
European banks faced the possibility of a bail-in in 2011, they began to issue
more debt at the subsidiary level than at the parent level.' Likewise, when
117. See Wigand, supra note 104, at 9.
118. See, e.g., Joshua R. Mitts, Systemic Risk and Managerial Incentives in the Dodd-Frank Orderly
Liquidation Authority, 1 J. FIN. LEG. 51 (2015).
1ig. While Congress would need to enact legislation permitting bailouts, it is certainly possible
that Congress would do so when another catastrophic crisis hits. See id. at 17.
12o. Orderly Liquidation Authority: FDIC Announces Its Strategy, MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP 6
(2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/l2o516-Orderly-Liquidation-Authority
-FDIC-Announces-Its-Strategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/8HBP-HLRX]. Others have noted the
possibility of increased issuance of external debt at the subsidiary level. See Joseph H. Som-
mer, Why Bail-in? And How!, 2o ECON. POL'Y REv., Dec. 2014, at 207, 220 ("Market forces
may not provide enough [parental debt], since firms may prefer to issue liabilities through
the subsidiaries, as profitable financial products."); Tarullo, supra note 81 ("Absent [a re-
quirement that complex banking firms hold minimum amounts of long-term, unsecured
debt at the holding company level], one could expect declines in these levels as the quite flat
yield curve of recent years steepens; indeed, we have recently seen some evidence of the be-
ginnings of such declines.").
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Portuguese bank Banco Espirito Santo was bailed out in August 2014 at the
cost of C4.9 billion to the Portuguese government, the senior bondholders of
the bank were left virtually untouched, showing the Portuguese government's
reluctance to impose harsh costs on senior creditors even when government
funds were at risk.121 As a result, in pricing senior bonds of European banks,
debt markets have been slow to account for the possibility of a bail-in, antici-
pating that European governments will protect senior bondholders instead of
bailing them in.'" This feedback mechanism demonstrates that when the mar-
ket perceives the possibility of a bailout, it will correspondingly reduce the cost
of credit demanded. In order to take advantage of this feedback mechanism, it
is possible that U.S. financial groups would also move toward a bottom-heavy
debt structure to increase the probability of a bailout, thereby hindering the
implementation of SPOE.
C. The SPOE Approach Relies on an Unrealistic Assumption of Clear Asset
Segregation
Lastly, the SPOE strategy presupposes that the FDIC will be able to divide
the assets of the company neatly among different subsidiaries, but such an as-
sumption may be incorrect in many cases.' 23 There are examples of corporate
groups that do not keep a good record of the division of assets among different
constituent legal entities within the group, as they only have to report consoli-
dated numbers.' 4 As shown below in the cases of Lehman Brothers and
Deutsche Bank, financial groups-with fluid assets that quickly move on and
off their balance sheets - also encounter this problem.
In the context of SPOE resolution, clear asset segregation is important for
three reasons. First, the bail-in recapitalization approach requires that the
FDIC make an accurate valuation of the assets of the parent. The bail-in recapi-
talization essentially mimics a judicial valuation of a company's assets during
121. Editorial, Another Lousy Bank Bailout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2014, http://online.ws.com
/articles/espirito-santos-lousy-bailout-14o 718210 9 [http://perma.cc/MX3A-7XWN].
122. See Alice Gledhill, Bail-in of Senior European Bank Debt Not Fully Priced in, REuTERs, Oct.
31, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2o14/1o/ 31/banks-debt-idUSL6NoSF 34W2o141o 31
[http ://perma.cc/ZK6U-PWQY].
123. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman pioneered the idea of"asset partitioning." Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44 EUR. ECON.
REv. 807 (2000). Protection of a parent's assets from a subsidiary's creditors through the
corporate veil (which they term "asset partitioning") allows for better monitoring and effi-
cient resolution in bankruptcy. Here, however, I use the term "asset segregation," as this
Part focuses on situations where the ownership of a certain asset lies clearly within a corpo-
rate group but not clearly within a particular constituent company of that corporate group.
124. Squire, supra note 115, at 615-16.
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bankruptcy proceedings. The FDIC (acting as the judge) determines what the
assets are worth and what the appropriate level of equity is given the asset size,
and it imposes corresponding losses on the creditors in exchange for equity in
the bridge company.12 The amount of conversion depends on the gap between
the assets and the liabilities of the parent. If the assets are overvalued, then too
little unsecured debt would be converted into equity in the bridge company.
Such a mistake would lead to a lower than optimal level of equity for the bridge
company.
For example, assume that in order to provide support to its subsidiaries the
parent has to have at least a io% leverage ratio and that the parent has $80 in
assets and $1oo in unsecured liabilities.26 So the parent is insolvent and its eq-
uity is worth nothing. If the FDIC overvalues the assets and determines that
the parent has assets worth $9o, the FDIC would write down $19 of the liabili-
ties and give loo% of the equity in the bridge company to the parent's creditors
whose claims were written down, believing that it has restored the equity posi-
tion of the bridge company to $9, equal to io% of the assets. Yet if after the
dust clears the bridge company's assets are worth $8o, the bridge company
would still be insolvent, and it would be forced to undergo the resolution pro-
cess again to further write down $9 of the liabilities. Given the turmoil to
which a resolution process - however stable - can lead, this would be a subop-
timal result.
On the other hand, if the FDIC undervalues the assets in the presence of
multiple tiers of liabilities, then the junior creditors would take a greater loss,
while senior creditors would reap a windfall. Although the result of undervalu-
ation would overcapitalize the bridge company, the junior creditors would
want to be compensated for this risk of greater loss by charging a higher inter-
est rate. 27 For instance, assume that the parent has $80 in assets, $70 in senior
debt, and $30 in subordinated debt, and assume that the FDIC believes lo% to
be the appropriate capital ratio necessary for the parent to provide support to
its subsidiaries. The company is clearly insolvent, so equity is irrelevant. With-
out undervaluation, the FDIC would write down subordinated debt to $2 and
give the subordinated debt holders the entire equity in the bridge company
(worth $8 now), meaning that the subordinated creditors get $1o. If the FDIC
undervalues the assets to $70, it would wipe out the subordinated creditors,
write down the senior creditors' debt to $63, and give the senior creditors the
1l5 . FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 6.
126. For the sake of simplicity, assume there is no other debt.
127. One possible counterargument is that since old junior creditors will get the equity stake in
the recapitalized company, whatever they lose on their debt would be offset by the gains on
their equity in the recapitalized company. However, equity and debt have different payoff
profiles, so they cannot be treated as completely interchangeable.
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entire equity in the bridge company. That would amount to a windfall for the
senior creditors at the expense of the subordinated creditors, and such an error
in valuation would lead to fairness and efficiency concerns.128
Second, a clear division of assets is important in facilitating the ex post res-
olution of problematic subsidiaries. Under the SPOE strategy, after the initial
recapitalization of the parent, the FDIC may also restructure the remainder of
the business, including shrinking the subsidiaries that caused the distress,
breaking them up, or liquidating them.29 Such restructuring requires an accu-
rate assessment of the assets and the liabilities of each subsidiary to determine
financial viability. Furthermore, in order to separate a problematic subsidiary
from the rest of the financial group and liquidate it, the FDIC would need to
know which assets belong to the problematic subsidiary and which assets do
not. Without clear asset segregation, the FDIC would not be able to make an
accurate assessment of each individual subsidiary's viability, hampering the
post-resolution restructuring process.
Lastly, as a corollary, a clear division of assets among different subsidiaries
is important to reduce uncertainty in the marketplace. As noted in Part II, an
optimal resolution mechanism should aim to reduce uncertainty in the market-
place in order to mitigate a drastic reduction in risk appetite. Uncertainty and
ambiguity lead to risk-averse behavior, as demonstrated during the 2007-08
crisis,'3° and market-wide risk-aversion can freeze the flow of credit.
The lack of a clear division among the assets of different subsidiaries can
lead to risk aversion because the counterparties and the creditors of a particular
subsidiary would not know the financial viability of that subsidiary. The de-
termination of viability hinges on the amount of assets each subsidiary has.
Hence, whether certain subsidiaries may be restructured and whether such re-
structuring would affect the creditors of the relevant subsidiaries are questions
that cannot be answered without a clear division of assets. In normal times, the
lack of a clear demarcation among the assets of different subsidiaries does not
pose a problem, as the probability of failure and loss to creditors is low. When
financial institutions are weakened and market conditions are unfavorable,
however, this lack of asset segregation can heighten uncertainty and, conse-
quently, risk-aversion. The legal regime governing corporate structures allows
a corporate group to compartmentalize its assets among different subsidiaries,
but if a financial group does not divide its assets clearly among different sub-
sidiaries, then the protection offered by the legal regime is useless.
128. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, iol HARv. L. REV.
775 (1988).
129. FDIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at ii.
130. See Nina Boyarchenko, Ambiguity Shifts and the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, 59 J. MONETARY
ECON. 493 (2012).
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Despite the importance of a clear demarcation among the assets of different
constituent companies of a financial group, there is evidence that financial
groups do not maintain such demarcations, unintentionally or intentionally.
One such example is the litigation between Lehman Brothers Holdings' bank-
ruptcy estate and Barclays over the British bank's purchase of Lehman's U.S.
broker-dealer operation in bankruptcy.'3 ' Lehman's bankruptcy estate asserted
that Barclays had made a side deal with certain Lehman executives -an agree-
ment that was a sweetheart deal for Barclays in several ways. '32 First, assets
were transferred at a discount to book value: while the assets were worth $75
billion, Barclays paid only $7o billion. 3 Second, Barclays was allowed to ter-
minate a repurchase agreement under which it provided Lehman's brokerage
business with short-term financing, with terms stipulating that Barclays would
foreclose on the collateral posted for the repo and keep any excess. 34 Since
Lehman had posted excess collateral of $5 to $7 billion, Barclays pocketed the
excess collateral value.13 ' Third, Lehman executives engaged in an asset
"scramble" to find more assets to hand over to Barclays in the sale, 36 culminat-
ing in the transfer of $5 billion worth of assets without consideration. 37 Lastly,
Barclays presented an inflated value of assumed liabilities to the court to make
the deal look more favorable to Lehman's bankruptcy estate than it actually
was.', 8 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that none of these maneuvers was
disclosed to the court, to Lehman's counsel, or to Lehman's executives not in-
volved in the negotiations.1 39
Ruling on the case, Judge James Peck was persuaded by Lehman's factual
allegations. In his opinion, he noted that "[m]ovants have proven that some
very significant information was left out of the record of the hearing on Leh-
man's motion to approve the sale of the Broker-Dealer Business to
Barclays ... 4o He also acknowledged the "asset scramble" that occurred just
131. Lehman Bros. Holdings v. Barclays Capital, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings), 44S B.R.
143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
132. Adversary Complaint at 2-3, Lehman Bros. Holdings v. Barclays Capital, Inc. (In re Lehman
Bros. Holdings), 445 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08-13555 JMP), 2009 WL
3848374.
133. Id. at ii.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 18-19.
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. at 19-20.
138. Id. at 13-14.
139. Id. at 2-3.
140. Lehman, 44S B.R. at 15o.
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before the asset purchase deal closed. 4 Although Judge Peck declined to re-
verse the court's approval of the deal and noted that the additional information
would not have changed the ruling at the time of the deal given the extraordi-
nary circumstances, 42 his opinion bolsters the credibility of the complaint's
factual allegations. 43
The Lehman case provides a troubling insight into the asset divisions -or
lack thereof- in a systemically important financial institution. The fact that $s
billion in assets could be put together in a Friday morning scramble shows the
scope of the gray area. Moreover, the complaint alleged that Lehman became
aware of the windfall to Barclays only after court-ordered discovery. 44 It is
quite astonishing that a $5 billion understatement in assumed assets and a $1
billion overstatement in assumed liabilities went unnoticed, indicating the
depth of the fog facing creditors in the liquidation of a systemically important
financial institution.
What makes the uncertainty worse in the case of a financial institution is
the fact that unlike non-financial firms, which have most assets on-site, finan-
cial institutions have significant assets that are held by other parties.4 s For ex-
ample, Lehman alleged that its executives transferred a $5 to $7 billion windfall
to Barclays by terminating the repurchase agreement with Barclays and letting
Barclays keep the excess collateral. 46 Similarly, assets belonging to Lehman but
held by other parties formed the core of the "asset scramble" and the basis of an
appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.147
141. Id. at 189.
142. Id. at 151-52.
143. The case was appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros. Inc.), 478 B.R. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Judge Katherine Forrest affirmed in part and reversed in part. However, the appeal was lim-
ited to the interpretation of whether 15c3-3 assets, margin assets, and clearance box assets
were included in the asset purchase agreement according to its proper interpretation, and
the opinion did not touch on the factual allegations of the complaint.
144. Adversary Complaint, supra note 132, at 2.
145. For example, as of the end of 2013, Goldman Sachs had $62.3 billion in financial instrument
assets pledged as collateral. Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form lo-K) 125 (Feb. 27,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/ooo119312 5 14o73792/d655877dlok
.htm [http://perma.cc/REL6-K9H6].
146. Adversary Complaint, supra note 132, at 18.
147. These assets include margin assets, 15c3-3 assets, and clearance box assets. Margin assets are
"approximately $4 billion in assets that had been maintained by LBI [Lehman Brothers,
Inc.] at various financial institutions 'in connection with LBI's [exchange-traded deriva-
tives] business.'" Barclays Capital, 478 B.R. at 577 (quoting In re Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 15c3-3 assets are "(i) $769 million in securi-
ties segregated by LBI for its customers in compliance with SIPA and Rule 15c3-3 and (ii)
$507 million in assets posted by LBI as margin with the [Options Clearing Corporation]
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These assets held by other parties can further complicate the division of assets
within a financial group.' 8
What's worse, ambiguity about the size and division of the assets of a fi-
nancial group may be intentional in some cases. During the height of the finan-
cial crisis, for example, Anglo Irish Bank, Ireland's third largest bank, was
mired in a scandal amid allegations that its chairman, Sean FitzPatrick, had
hidden €87 million in loans from the bank's shareholders. 4 9 More recently, it
was reported that Deutsche Bank had engaged in an accounting maneuver to
exclude E395.5 billion in assets from its balance sheet. x5' These maneuvers can
create substantial uncertainty among creditors and general market participants
over the size and the division of assets within systemically important financial
institutions.
In sum, these maneuvers - either intentional or unintentional - that ob-
scure the size and division of assets can be toxic by increasing uncertainty in
the marketplace. From an ex ante perspective, these maneuvers prevent credi-
tors and shareholders from accurately assessing the financial health of a con-
stituent legal entity and from curbing excessive risk-taking. From an ex post
resolution perspective, the blurring of the lines among different subsidiaries
can lead to ambiguity and risk-aversion because creditors cannot ascertain the
likelihood of loss. This problem is accentuated under the SPOE strategy, since
the approach relies fundamentally on the division of assets between the parent
and the subsidiaries. If the subsidiary creditors cannot ascertain the loss-
absorbing capacity of the parent and, consequently, their likelihood of loss,
they can run from the operating subsidiaries as well (for example, by declining
to roll over financing), thereby undermining the main goal of the SPOE strate-
gy.
and listed as a debit item in LBI's reserve calculation for purposes of Rule 15c3-3." Id. at
579-80 (quoting In re Lehman, 445 B.R. at 191). Clearance box assets are "approximately
$1.9 billion in unencumbered securities held in LBI's 'clearance box' at the [Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation]." Id. at 580 (quoting In re Lehman, 445 B.R. at 199).
148. Also, the counterparties holding the assets posted as collateral can rehypothecate those as-
sets, lending them out or posting them as collateral themselves, which further complicates
the asset calculation.
149. See Anglo Irish Bank Loses 2 Executives in Loan Scandal, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2008,
http ://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/i2/i9/business/worldbusiness/i9iht-i9irish.188215o3.html
[http://perma.cc/82NY-MA431.
iso. See Elisa Martinuzzi & Vernon Silver, Deutsche Bank Opaque Loans from Brazil to Italy
Hide Risk, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2013, u1:oi PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-07-11/deutsche-bank-opaque-loans-from-brazil-to-italy-hide-risk.html [http://perma
.cc/8JDH-BC6W].
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V. IMPROVING THE OLA AND THE SPOE STRATEGY
Part IV identified three major weaknesses of the OLA and the SPOE strate-
gy from the perspective of corporate group structure: (1) they may encourage
moral hazard among subsidiary creditors and counterparties; (2) they may en-
courage financial groups to shift their debt to the subsidiary level; and (3) im-
plementation of the SPOE strategy is difficult without a clear division of assets
among the subsidiaries of the failed financial group.
The FDIC has recognized the second problem - liability shifting - and is in
the process of adopting rules to require that systemically important financial
institutions hold a certain amount of long-term liabilities at the parent level (in
order to facilitate bail-ins).,5s However, this is an inadequate solution. First,
this solution does not address the moral hazard and the asset segregation prob-
lems. Second, such a minimum requirement requires calibration of the amount
necessary for a bail-in, and this may prove to be incorrect if a firm suffers ex-
tremely catastrophic losses.
As such, Part V proposes two additional solutions to complement the min-
imum liability requirement: an expanded FDIC backstop and subsidiary-level
stress-testing.
A. The FDIC Should Embrace an Expanded Government Backstop but Impose
Corresponding Costs To Reduce Moral Hazard
We cannot address the issue of moral hazard of subsidiary creditors effec-
tively without understanding the policy trade-off between bank runs and moral
hazard. For example, imposing discipline by binding the FDIC's hands and
imposing losses on the subsidiaries' creditors can reduce moral hazard but may
also lead to runs in times of crisis. In particular, if operating subsidiaries' credi-
tors decide to withdraw their funding and the subsidiaries face operational dif-
ficulties as a result, such a run would undermine the fundamental goal of the
SPOE approach: the protection of going-concern value during liquidation.
Given these conflicting policy considerations, an appropriate solution
should remove the incentives for creditors to withdraw their funding while im-
posing the costs of a government backstop on the financial institutions them-
selves. One such solution is to align the OLA more closely with the FDIC's
regulation and resolution system for depository institutions." 2 Under this solu-
tion, the FDIC would substantially expand its OLF backstop, making it akin to
1s1. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,623 (Dec. 18, 2013).
152. For an explanation of the FDIC's role in regulation and resolution of depository institutions,
see FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 19, 37-38 (2014).
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full-scale deposit insurance, while levying assessments on systemically im-
portant financial institutions to fill the OLF. The "deposit insurance" would
apply to the subsidiaries' creditors, in order to maintain stable operation of the
subsidiaries. At the same time, the FDIC (or a similar regulator) should scruti-
nize and monitor systemically important financial institutions more closely.
This approach has several advantages. First of all, as long as the FDIC
makes its expanded backstop explicit, the creditors would not have an incentive
to run. With an expanded backstop, the creditors know that they would be as
well off if they stayed with the financial group as they would be if they with-
drew their funding, especially if the statutory provisions were changed to pre-
fund the OLF.53 Second, this plan would impose the costs of the bailout on the
financial institutions themselves. Not only would this approach resolve fairness
considerations, it would also even the playing field between large and small fi-
nancial institutions. While large firms may benefit from the implicit subsidy of
an expected bailout, the savings in funding costs would be offset by greater as-
sessments. In fact, the offset may be even more effective in the context of sys-
temically important financial institutions than in the context of traditional in-
sured banks, as there are far fewer systemically important financial
institutions."5 4 Third, the expanded government backstop, coupled with ap-
propriate assessments on the financial institutions, would reduce the political
costs associated with government rescues, since the resolutions would be fund-
ed by the industry itself and not with taxpayer money.
Expanded backstop coverage, of course, weakens the monitoring incentives
for creditors and counterparties. For example, in the context of traditional
commercial banks, individual depositors rarely examine their bank's financial
strength. After all, they will be fully repaid up to the deposit insurance limit if
the bank fails,"'5 so the financial strength of the bank is an irrelevant factor.
With an expanded FDIC backstop, other creditors would lose the incentive to
monitor the risk-taking activities of systemically important financial institu-
tions as well.
153. See Thomas W. Joo, A Comparison of Liquidation Regimes: Dodd-Frank's Orderly Liquidation
Authority and the Securities Investor Protection Act, 6 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 47, 70
(2011) ("OLA does not.. . establish prefunding of any kind.").
1S4. In the context of a traditional insured bank, the incentive to monitor another bank is very
weak; even if that bank fails and the FDIC incurs losses as a result, such a loss will be dis-
tributed among thousands of FDIC-insured banks in the United States. In contrast, since
the failure of another systemically important financial institution will impose more concen-
trated costs on other such institutions, there is greater incentive to monitor other institu-
tions' activities.
5s. See Deposit Insurance FAQO FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/deposit
/deposits/faq.html [http ://perma.cc/JD8X-TCUX].
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In order to address this side effect, the FDIC or another regulatory authori-
ty must step in to monitor and supervise systemically important financial insti-
tutions. As noted previously, the parent's shareholders and creditors may not
be able to monitor the subsidiaries' risk-taking activities perfectly, and the reg-
ulators, with their authority to demand information from systemically im-
portant financial institutions, can fill that gap. While the Dodd-Frank Act es-
tablishes a robust regulatory regime, regulation cannot survive without close
supervision. In regulating the systemically important financial institutions'
risk-taking activities, the FDIC must closely monitor those institutions to en-
sure compliance. The Dodd-Frank Act provides for several ways in which regu-
lators can receive information from systemically important financial institu-
tions, such as the living will s6 and data submission to the Office of Financial
Research. 7 These disclosures must be carefully scrutinized by banking regula-
tors to deter excessive risk-taking and should be expanded as necessary.
Moreover, expanded coverage with assessments from systemically im-
portant financial institutions should also motivate other financial institutions
to compensate for the reduced monitoring by creditors. Taxpayer bailouts do
not give individual taxpayers incentives to supervise large financial institutions
because they do not have the power to do so, and the responsibility is spread
out among millions. Rescues funded by the industry itself, on the other hand,
concentrate the costs in the hands of a few large financial institutions that act
as repeat-player counterparties to each other. While an idiosyncratic failure of a
single financial institution would not trigger a receivership under Title II, the
failure of a large number of systemically important financial institutions
would, with attendant costs imposed on the industry. As such, each systemical-
ly important financial institution has an incentive-and the capability-to
monitor its counterparties in order to discourage dangerous asset correlation
and to avoid the failure of a large number of systemically important financialinstitutions. 8
156. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 5
65(d), 124 Star. 1376, 1426-27 (2OLO). Living wills, formally known as "resolution plans,"
must be filed by bank holding companies with consolidated assets over $50 billion and by
nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for
supervision by the Federal Reserve. The living wills must describe "the company's strategy
for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure of the
company." Resolution Plans, BD. GOvERNORS FED. REs. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov
/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm [http://perma.cc/R8SH-5SVN].
is". Dodd-Frank Act § 153.
i*s. In particular, positive asset correlation, in which two sets of assets rise and fall together, is
dangerous because when one firm's assets are impaired, other firms in the market likely suf-
fer similar impairments as well. As a corollary, when one firm fails, creditors of other firms
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There are several possible objections to this package of proposals. One is
that when systemically important financial institutions do fail and the OLF in-
curs large losses, the FDIC will not levy sufficient assessments due to pressure
from the financial industry. This is a valid argument: during the Savings and
Loan Crisis, for example, industry lobbying blocked the recapitalization of the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation fund, culminating in the
creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation to take the fund's place"S9 Even
in the absence of such lobbying, cross-firm correlations in portfolio holdings
mean that when a systemically important financial institution fails, other firms
may be in danger as well. 6 Under such circumstances, the FDIC may be un-
willing to levy assessments on ailing financial institutions. But this concern has
already been addressed: the Dodd-Frank Act ties the FDIC's hands in levying
assessments on systemically important financial institutions. Under the Act,
the FDIC must charge assessments within sixty months of the issuance of an
OLF obligation, giving it some flexibility in choosing the best timing but en-
suring that it does not delay assessments indefinitely. 6 As a comparison, in
the case of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), the Dodd-Frank Act mandates a
minimum designated reserve ratio (ratio of DIF balance to estimated insured
deposits) of 1.35%. 62 When the FDIC expects the reserve ratio of the Deposit
Insurance Fund to fall below the minimum set by statute or when the amount
actually does fall below the minimum, the FDIC must establish a restoration
plan to bring the reserve ratio above the minimum within eight years., 63 Title
II thus binds the FDIC's hands more tightly in the case of the OLF than in the
case of the DIF. Given the DIF's successful recapitalization after the 2007-08
crisis through assessments on insured depository institutions, the OLF could
well experience similar success.
Second, one may argue that increased supervision and regulation of sys-
temically important financial institutions would have adverse effects, both on
159. The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov
/bank/historical/s%261/ [http://perma.cc/6VJN-58EV].
16o. When a firm fails because of idiosyncratic shock (e.g., fraud and loss of reputation as in the
case of Drexel Burnham Lambert) this problem does not arise. But in such a case, the
need for an OLA resolution also does not arise since there is no systemic risk. See James
Bullard, Worry Less About Systemic Risk, More About Inflation, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LoUIs (20o8), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=97o [http://perma
.cc/LFH6-6TU9] ("In the recent history of financial markets, there have been major failures
that did not seem to have a systemic effect on the market. Among these are Drexel Burnham
Lambert in 199o.").
161. Dodd-FrankAct § 210(o)(1)(B).
162. Id. § 334(a). The FDIC is free to set a higher reserve ratio; for example, the 2012 reserve ratio
was 2.00%. Deposit Insurance Fund Management, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/fund.html [http://perma.cc/SgVT-BYJZ].
163. 12 U.S.C. 5 181 7(b)( 3)(E)(i)-(ii) (2012).
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the real economy and on the stability of financial markets. Increased regulation
may increase the cost of credit for borrowers, with detrimental effects for the
real economy. On the financial stability front, increased regulation may endow
these institutions with an implicit government backstop, since the markets
would believe that the government would not allow a systemically important
financial institution to fail.
However, these adverse effects are far from certain. For one, it is unlikely
that increased regulation of systemically important financial institutions would
raise borrowing costs substantially. 6, In addition, even without formal desig-
nation of systemically important financial institutions, it is possible -and even
likely- that markets will believe that the largest financial institutions already
have implicit government guarantees.
A third objection is that a clawback applied to all creditors is an option su-
perior to an expanded FDIC backstop since it imposes costs directly on credi-
tors, encourages them to monitor the firm's risk-taking activities, and still
eliminates the incentive to run. Such an argument is an extension of the status
quo embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act mandates assessments first on
the claimants who received additional payments during a resolution and then
on large financial institutions. 6, In particular, the FDIC is to impose assess-
ment "as soon as practicable" on any creditor that received any additional pay-
ments pursuant to the FDIC's authority to treat some creditors more favorably
than others. 6 6 The FDIC is to claw back the difference between the actual
amount received by the creditor and the amount that the creditor would have
otherwise received based on liquidation value. 6' Hence, the status quo embod-
ied in the Dodd-Frank Act contemplates a clawback for a subset of creditors.
In contrast, this Note's proposal would restrict the base for assessments to
large financial institutions, while an alternative proposal would expand the
base to all creditors. In theory, the alternative is indeed the superior proposal:
it reduces the need for the FDIC to fill in the monitoring gap left by creditors
without increasing the possibility of a run.
In practice, however, such a proposal would be very difficult to implement.
Identifying a suitable cutoff point for clawbacks would be at best arbitrary. The
absence of a cutoff renders clawbacks impossible since the FDIC cannot pursue
164. While increased regulation or supervision and higher capital requirements are not entirely
the same, the scholarly work on the effect of higher capital requirements can be instructive.
For an example of scholarship that found little evidence of higher lending rates as a result of
higher capital requirements, see Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A
Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (2011).
165. Dodd-FrankAct 5 210(0)(1)(D)(i), § 210(o)(i)(D)(ii)(II).
166. Id. § 210(o)(1)(D)(i).
167. Id § 210(0)(i)(D)(i)(I)-(II).
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every creditor who has withdrawn money from the financial group. Setting an
arbitrary cutoff date (for example, ninety days prior to the commencement of
receivership, consistent with the cutoff for voidable preferences under the
Bankruptcy Code 68 ) may even accelerate runs: creditors would want to with-
draw their money as early as possible to avoid being subject to the clawback.
Moreover, since financial institutions are heavily funded with debt and debt-
like instruments, the number of creditors that the FDIC would have to pursue
would be overwhelming. In the case of Lehman, there were nearly four thou-
sand general creditor claims permitted against the bankruptcy estate, and ad-
ministering the claims process has been so complex that it is still going on
more than six years after Lehman's Chapter ii bankruptcy filing.i 9 Reversing
this process to claw back proceeds from all creditors would be even more com-
plex, as many creditors would resist. Additionally, the process would increase
uncertainty among creditors, since they would not know whether the FDIC
would be pursuing them for clawbacks. In the worst-case scenario, given that
the threat of avoidance actions has often been used as a bargaining chip by the
management (which has the power to seek avoidance) against certain creditors
before"z' and during 7' bankruptcy, the FDIC may engage in similar behavior,
using clawback provisions to pick the winners and losers among creditors
based on its systemic risk determination. Such a policy would amount to a re-
turn to the ad hoc bailout model.
In contrast, the approach advocated by this Note is much easier to imple-
ment, as it only requires assessments on systemically important financial insti-
tutions, which are much fewer in number. The FDIC already levies regular as-
sessments on thousands of depository institutions and would readily be able to
charge assessments on an even smaller number of systemically important fi-
nancial institutions.
B. Subsidiary-Level Stress Testing Can Be a Self-Enforcing Solution to the Asset
Segregation Problem
Unfortunately, resolving the asset segregation issue is much more difficult
for systemically important financial institutions than for non-financial compa-
nies. In a normal proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code, a judge who faces a
complex web of cross-stream, upstream, and downstream guarantees can re-
168. 11 U.S.C. 5 54 7 (b)(4) (A) (2012).
169. Trustee's Eleventh Interim Report for the Period February 15, 2014 Through September 9,
2014 and Quarterly Report on the General Creditor Claims Process at 5, In re Lehman Bros.
Inc., No. 08-01420 (SCC) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
170. ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER ii: REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES 111 (2008).
171. J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 298-3o (1991).
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sort to substantive consolidation."2 Under substantive consolidation, if the
guarantees are impossible to untangle or the accounting records at the subsidi-
ary level are woefully incomplete, the judge may treat all constituent legal enti-
ties in a corporate group as one single legal entity and consolidate the group's
assets and liabilities into one pool. 73 Since all internal boundaries are disre-
garded, the fact that there is no clear division of assets is no longer relevant.
Given that it negates corporate boundaries, substantive consolidation is indeed
an extraordinary measure, one to be used sparingly. 74 Despite the downsides,
however, substantive consolidation does provide an answer -albeit an imper-
fect one -when a corporate group fails to maintain clear boundaries among its
subsidiaries.
On the other hand, in a resolution under Title II, substantive consolidation
is no longer an option. Applying substantive consolidation to a financial group
would shut down the operating subsidiaries by disrupting the flow of credit to
them. The subsidiaries' debt would be subject to write-down and restructur-
ing, leading those creditors to terminate their relationship with the subsidiar-
ies. Such termination is contrary to the goal of the SPOE approach, which
seeks to minimize disruptions to the overall financial system by keeping viable
subsidiaries in operation. As such, in order to keep viable subsidiaries out of
resolution, the FDIC cannot cut through the web of intra-group guarantees
and murky accounting and must instead untangle those knots.
When a financial group fails, however, time is not on the FDIC's side. As
noted in Part II, speed is one of the four goals that an optimal resolution re-
gime must pursue, since financial institutions tend to be "melting ice cu-
be[s].""7 s Trying to untangle the complexities of intra-group guarantees and
divide the group's assets among hundreds of subsidiaries may not be possible
under such time pressure. Therefore, ex ante measures that simplify intra-
group guarantees and enforce asset segregation are necessary to facilitate ex
post resolution of complex financial groups. One such measure is to expand
stress testing -an analytic exercise designed to evaluate a financial institution's
ability to withstand a hypothetical negative shock- to the subsidiary level.
172. See Squire, supra note 115, at 608.
173. Id.
174. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3 d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[B]ecause substantive consolida-
tion is extreme (it may affect profoundly creditors' rights and recoveries) and imprecise, this
'rough justice' remedy should be rare and, in any event, one of last resort after considering
and rejecting other remedies.").
175. See Comment Letter from the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass'n & the Clearing House Ass'n
L.L.C. to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 79, at A-5.
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Currently, the Dodd-Frank Act requires supervisory stress tests only at the
consolidated level.176 While conducting a supervisory stress test at the consoli-
dated level reduces costs and helps regulators to understand the higher-level
financial condition of a systemically important financial institution, it provides
no comprehensive micro-level view of the financial group. Stress tests conduct-
ed at the subsidiary level would fill that gap, giving regulators a more detailed
view of systemically important financial institutions' capital conditions.
This approach has several advantages. Most importantly for the purpose of
this Note, with regard to the asset segregation issue, subsidiary-level stress
tests would force financial groups to maintain accurate records of the asset di-
visions among subsidiaries. Since regulators would need to calculate capital ra-
tios under different scenarios at the subsidiary level, systemically important fi-
nancial institutions would have to provide detailed information about the
assets in each subsidiary. If the corporate group structure is too complicated,
then mandating subsidiary-level stress tests can also encourage financial
groups to rationalize their corporate group structures. A simple regulation
mandating a clear division of assets may be difficult to enforce, but the expan-
sion of stress tests to subsidiaries would allow regulators to enforce asset seg-
regation more rigorously, as they can cross-check between consolidated and
unconsolidated data to confirm that a financial group has properly segregated
its subsidiaries' assets.
While a stress test is not strictly necessary to develop a list of assets by legal
entity, the expansion of stress tests to subsidiaries has two other advantages
aside from the asset segregation consideration. First, subsidiary-level stress
tests can help regulators identify the particular sources of weakness in a finan-
cial group. With a consolidated stress test, regulators may not be able to pin-
point the source of the problem. Often, one part of a financial group can incur
substantial losses that engulf the whole group, and a financial group is only as
strong as its weakest link. For Lehman Brothers, the source of its troubles was
its $90 billion real estate portfolio."' For AIG, the sources were derivative ac-
tivities at AIG Financial Products and the group's securities lending business. l7
Second, particularly with respect to multinational financial groups, the as-
sumption- inherent in consolidated stress tests-that a financial group can
176. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 165(i)(')(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) ("The Board of Governors, in coordination with
the appropriate primary financial regulatory agencies and the Federal Insurance Office, shall
conduct annual analyses in which nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of
Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection (a) are subject to evaluation
of whether such companies have the capital, on a total consolidated basis, necessary to absorb
losses as a result of adverse economic conditions.") (emphasis added).
r17. FiNANcIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 326.
178. Id. at 344-45.
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move capital and liquidity among different subsidiaries may not hold true. 7 9
For example, sometimes regulators in different countries may attempt to iso-
late the local subsidiaries of a multinational financial group ("ringfencing") to
minimize the impact on the domestic economy.8 ° By conducting stress tests at
the subsidiary level, regulators can understand the impact of the ringfencing
scenario and the capital and liquidity problems facing each subsidiary if a fi-
nancial group fails to provide support because of legal and market conditions.
Of course, the biggest downside of conducting subsidiary-level stress tests
would be the cost. As highlighted in Part III, systemically important financial
institutions tend to have a large number of subsidiaries; JPMorgan Chase, for
example, has more than five hundred.' Conducting stress tests on every one
of those subsidiaries would be nearly impossible. Instead, regulators could
adopt a middle-ground approach, mandating stress tests on a certain number
of a financial group's largest subsidiaries. Such a middle-ground approach
would not give regulators a microscopic view of a financial group's conditions
but would shrink the scope of stress testing to a manageable one and balance
the costs and benefits of subsidiary-level testing.
CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to assess the weaknesses of the Orderly Liquidation
Authority under the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDIC's Single Point of Entry
strategy for implementing the OLA, with particular emphasis on the corporate
group structure of these financial institutions. First and foremost, the losses
imposed on the parent creditors amount to an ex post subsidy from the parent
creditors to the subsidiary creditors. Foreseeing this subsidy, the parent's credi-
tors would adjust the interest rate they charge and increase their monitoring
activity, somewhat offsetting the lower cost of credit and decreased monitoring
incentives of the subsidiary creditors. But that adjustment still would not fully
counter the point that the parent creditors cannot monitor the financial group's
risk-taking activities as well as the subsidiary creditors can, leading to a moral
hazard problem.
179. See Eugenio Cerutti & Christian Schmieder, The Need for "Un-Consolidating" Consolidated
Banks' Stress Tests 16 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/12/288, 2012), https://www.imf.org
/external/pubs/ft/wp/2o12/wp12288.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KXY-U22F].
i8o. Even the United States effectively ringfences domestic operations of foreign banking organi-
zations by requiring an intermediate holding company (IHC) structure for foreign banking
organizations (FBOs) and mandating stress-tests, a capital-plan rule, and liquidity require-
ments for U.S. IHCs. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements
for Foreign Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed.
Reg. 76,628 (proposed Dec. 28, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
181. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 84, at 365-73.
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As a corollary to the fact that the SPOE approach in effect provides for a
subsidy from parent creditors to subsidiary creditors, financial groups may en-
gage in liability-shifting, changing their capital structures such that there is less
debt at the parent level. Such a change would undermine the OLA, forcing a
bailout in times of crisis. Increased probability of a bailout, in turn, would cre-
ate an even greater incentive to engage in liability-shifting, leading to a self-
reinforcing cycle that would put financial groups beyond the capabilities of the
SPOE approach.
In addition to these effects on incentives, this Note has pointed out issues
regarding the implementation of the SPOE strategy. The strategy requires a
clear division of assets and liabilities among the constituent companies of a fi-
nancial group, and there is evidence that some financial groups do not have
such clear asset segregation. Without asset segregation, the whole financial
group may be dragged into resolution, which would have devastating conse-
quences. The uncertainty associated with such a nightmare scenario would be
enough to kill a financial group and produce spillover effects.
Resolving these problems can be complicated for two reasons. With multi-
ple goals, a solution that fixes one problem can aggravate another, as exempli-
fied in the tradeoff between imposing discipline and preventing runs on sub-
sidiaries. Moreover, because of systemic risk concerns, failed financial
institutions must be addressed more carefully than bankrupt non-financial
firms, precluding the use of blunt tools such as substantive consolidation.
The package of solutions presented in this Note represents the first step in
reconciling these conflicts. Given the complications in the resolution of finan-
cial institutions, these solutions rest on two main principles. First, if govern-
ment rescues are anticipated and may be necessary under certain circumstanc-
es, then policymakers can offset the rescues' side effects by imposing
appropriate costs on the beneficiaries. The real source of the problems often as-
sociated with government rescues is that they are provided at little cost to the
beneficiaries, effectively subsidizing those institutions. By imposing appropri-
ate costs on the beneficiaries, however, the government is simply selling insur-
ance to systemically important financial institutions at a fair price. A govern-
ment backstop system, coupled with assessments on systemically important
financial institutions and direct regulation to allay monitoring issues, can miti-
gate moral hazard concerns without leading to debilitating runs.
Second, if the SPOE approach separates the parent and the subsidiaries,
other regulations under Dodd-Frank must address the subsidiaries as well.
Various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are interconnected and complement
each other. For instance, the information submitted as part of a living will (a
prepackaged bankruptcy plan mandated by Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act) can
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help the FDIC form a resolution plan under Title 11.182 As such, this Note sup-
ports expanding stress tests to major subsidiaries in order to remedy the asset
segregation problem, provide regulators with more information about poten-
tial sources of negative shocks, and ensure that there is enough debt at the par-
ent level to make the SPOE strategy possible.
These two principles represent a response to the complexities identified
earlier: embracing government rescues resolves the inherent conflict between
liquidity and moral hazard concerns, and expanding stress tests to the subsidi-
ary level aims to achieve greater precision in resolution policy, facilitating a
smoother implementation of the SPOE strategy.
18a. See supra note 156.
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